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Title: Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective

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Nuclear Weapon Security DOD Perspective

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Presentation Overview:

- DOD and DOE Nuclear Security Policy Standards
- Weapon Secure Storage Methods
- Modes of Transportation: DOD and DOE
- Security Breeches
- Basic Security Classification Practices
- Questions

DOD Security Policy

DOE Security Policy

There must be controls to:

1) Minimize possibility of accidents, inadvertent acts, or authorized activities that could lead to fire, deflagration, or unintended high-explosive detonation
2) Minimize the possibility of fire, high-explosive deflagration, or high-explosive detonation, given accidents or inadvertent acts
3) Minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts that could lead to high explosive deflagration or high-explosive detonation
4) Ensure adequate security of nuclear explosives
5) Minimize the possibility of or delay unauthorized nuclear detonation

Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. (n.d.). Security & control of nuclear explosives and nuclear warheads (DOE Order 452.4)

National Nuclear Security Administration

Physical Security

Concept of Operations (DOD/DOE)

- Layered, multi-disciplinary system to achieve defense in depth
- Limited Access
  - Ensure adequate security of nuclear explosives
- Physical Delay
  - Hardened facilities
- Deadly Force
  - Heavily armed response forces

Five Security Capabilities

- Deter
- Detect
- Delay
- Deny
- Defeat

Weapon Secure Storage Methods

- Above-ground weapons storage areas
  - CONUS Only (Picture)
- Underground storage complexes
- Weapon storage vaults
  - OCONUS Only
- ICBM silos
  - CONUS
- SSBN
  - Pier Side

Weapons Secure Area Security: Above Ground



Storage Bunkers and MMBs

Massive Modular Block (MMB)
14-17,000 lbs.

Entry Control Point/ Vehicle Barriers

Why do we have ECP barriers now?

Entry Control Point/ Vehicle Barriers

Badge Systems

- Type I: Badge scanner
- Type II: Badge scanner *and* PIN number
- Type III: Badge scanner, *and* PIN number, *and* Biometrics
  - Required for nuclear weapons



Overseas

- Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS)

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Silo

ICBM Site Layout



ICBM Launcher Closure

110 Ton Blast Door

Strategic Weapons Facilities

Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) Submarine

Trident Missile Tubes



DOD Transportation Methods

C-17: *Only* Aircraft Certified for Prime Nuclear Airlift Force (PNAF)

Air Force Missile Convoy

Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota

Friend or Foe?

USAF Payload Transporter (PT) convoy to and from a Silo to the Main Support Base (MSB)

Navy TRIDENT Transportation

Kneel Down Transport (KDT)

Explosive Handling Wharf (EHW)

Missile Erection Bridge (MEB)

DOE Transportation: NNSA Office of Secure Transport

National Nuclear Security Administration

NNSA Office of Secure Transport

- **Safeguard Transport (SGT) to and from military locations within the United States**
  - Nuclear weapons
  - Strategic quantities of special nuclear material (SNM)
  - Nuclear test devices

Security Breaches

- Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in Georgia
  - Seven members of “Plowshares 7” broke into Kings Bay Naval Base
  - Used bolt cutters to enter near a remote gate
  - Walked 2 miles through swamp and brush
  - Poured blood, spray painted and used a hammer on a Navy emblem
  - Did not reach higher security areas
  - Each member convicted of three felonies and a misdemeanor
  - Served 18 months and ordered to pay restitution

Security Breaches

- Three Dominican Nuns:
  06 October 2002
  - Dressed in white suits labeled “Citizens Weapons Inspection Team”
  - Cut three sections of fence with bolt cutters
  - Hammered on the launch cover and track
  - Drew six crosses made from their blood on silo cover
  - Brought their blood to site in four baby bottles

MM III Silo, N-8

Crosses drawn in blood

Launch Facility Security Breaches

- Nuns (continued)
  - Arrested 44 minutes later
  - Less than $1000 of damage
  - Sentenced to between 31 and 41 months of prison time
  - All are now free
  - First protesters charged under the Patriot Act
  - Maryland State Police added 2 of 3 nuns to the terrorist watch list in 2008

Adreth Platte, Carol Gilbert, Jackie Hudson

Launch Facility Security Breaches

- Other security breach events:
  - 28 June 2006: Two military vets and one Catholic priest dressed as clowns broke into a MM III launch area in ND
    - Had face paint, dunce caps, overalls, yellow wigs
  - Poured their blood and wrote "It's a sin to build a nuclear weapon" on the launch closure.
  - Hit silo covers with hammers and called for national repentance for WWII bombings on Japan

Part of a Michigan group called "Nuke watch"

Launch Facility Security Breaches

- 15 April 2010: Mr. James Richard Sauder at Minot AFB
  - Parked his van on perimeter then scaled the perimeter fence
  - Conducted interview with media until Security Forces arrived and reporter recommended that he surrender
  - Wanted a new union of the peoples of the world so he left many items such as yarn and his headdress with crystals from around the world

James Richard Sauder

- Called for everyone to "get along and become a unified global community"

Basic Security Classification Practices

What is Classified?

- Information that details a vulnerability is classified
- Specific location and type of weapon is classified
- Critical operational information (i.e., convoy details) is classified
- Goal is to deny adversary knowledge that reduces the deterrent or enhances their potential effectiveness

Stay Informed

- Do you know what's going on?

Questions?

PLEASE DRIVE SAFELY
UNMARKED NUCLEAR WARHEADS
TRAVEL THESE ROADS
CHILDREN RADIATION-FREE!